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ABSTRACT 
This article examines aspects of corporate governance in Singaporean public sector.  
Most government linked corporation in Singapore have performed well.  In addition 
these corporations have been largely successful in combating corruption.  Corruption 
has in recent years resulted in the collapse of some large private sector corporations 
such as Enron Energy and HIH Insurance. This paper suggests that large 
multinationals can benefit from governance strategies employed by the Singaporean 
public sector corporations.  Although the principal-agent problem is often stated in the 
context of private sector corporate governance, this paper discusses the problem within 
the public sector. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of private sector corporations is net profit maximization whereas 
the public sector corporations tend to focus on net benefits to the society.  Despite 
differences in objectives, at least some of the problems faced by the public and private 
corporations are very similar.  This paper focuses on the similarities with particular 
reference to Singapore.  Singapore is a city-state with real GDP per-capita of S$44,666 
in 2005, up from S$1,567 in 1965.  Singaporean economic system has been described as 
state directed capitalism where the state directly participates in business sector growth 
through the government-linked corporations (GLCs).1 
It is widely believed that the private sector corporations are more efficient as compared 
to the public sector corporations, which explains large scale privatisation in many 
developing countries.  The interesting thing about the Singaporean economy is that most 
state controlled corporations are very efficient and therefore it can be argued that the 
private sector corporations can in fact learn from their public sector counterparts.  
Corruption is an example of problems that are faced by both public and private 
corporations.  During the past few years several scandals involving manipulation of 
financial statements in private corporations have been reported by the media.2  
Corruption can also involve executive managers seeking opportunities to expropriate 
company’s funds to furnish their offices with unnecessary electronic gadgets and 
excessive business trips.  In addition, the managers may employ more workers than 
required thus raising the operating expenses unnecessarily.  In other words, corruption 
can take place in a typical private sector organization. Corruption is a type of Principal-
Agent problem where agent’s actions are inconsistent with the objectives of the 
principal.  Given the rising level of private sector corporate scandals, it is imperative 
that the private corporations look elsewhere for direction and guidance to further 
improve their management practices (Frey, 2003; Osterloh and Frey, 2003).  Principal-
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Agent problem is normally stated within the context of the private sector.  However, 
because the public corporations are bureaucratic and hierarchical, the principal-agent 
problem can also arise within the public corporations.3 
The choice of Singapore for this study is based on at least four reasons. First, Singapore 
is considered to be as one of the least corrupt countries in the world.4  It is useful thus to 
study how Singapore has successfully curbed the level of corruption.  In addition, 
Singapore has also fared well in some of the indicators relating to the quality of 
governance.  Second, Singapore’s GLCs have performed well as compared to a number 
of corporations within the Asia-Pacific region.5  In terms of annual sales turnover, the 
GLCs have performed well relative to most multinational corporations. Third, while 
many lessons from the Singaporean model may not be relevant to large countries, large 
private sector corporations or multinationals can benefit from the lessons that Singapore 
has to offer.  It is useful to recognize that Singapore’s public corporations have adopted 
a pay for performance principle which better aligns the interest of the agents with those 
of the principals.  The resulting set-up resembles the practices adopted by most private 
corporations.  Hence, it may not be wrong to conclude that Singaporean public sector 
corporations are being managed like large private sector corporations.  Finally, it is 
worth pointing out that as far as Singapore is concerned, the existing literature considers 
the principal-agent problem almost exclusively in the context of the private sector (see 
for example Eng and Mak, 1999; Phan and Mak, 1999; Heracleous, 1999; Goodwin and 
Seow, 1998; Pang and Leung, 2002 and Yeo and Koh, 2001). This article discusses the 
principal agent problem in Singaporean public sector. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows.  The next section examines the nature of 
the principal-agent problem in the public sector.  This section also outlines some 
difficulties faced by GLCs in Singapore.  Section 3 considers the problem of corruption 
and measures taken to curb corruption in Singapore. The last section contains some 
concluding remarks. 
 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
As far as the public listed companies are concerned, there is a separation of ownership 
and control.  Board of directors or other groups of professionals manage public 
companies on behalf of the shareholders.  Principal-Agent problem, also known as the 
agency problem, arises when the actions of the agent are inconsistent with the objectives 
of the principal.  This problem is normally described in the context of private sector 
management.  However Principal-Agent problem can also arise within the context of 
public sector management.  At an aggregate level, the voters (i.e., the public) can be 
considered as the principal and the cabinet ministers and/or members of parliament can 
be viewed as the agent.  It is possible that the two parties (voters and the members of 
parliament) have conflicting interests whereby the actions of the agents are inconsistent 
with the notion of maximizing the principals’ interest. 
This section considers two sets of relationship that exist between the principals and 
agents within the public sector.  The first involves the general public as the principals 
and the state as the agents where the state consists of the members of parliament (MPs) 
and cabinet members. The public elects the MPs to run the country on their behalf. 
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Among other things, the role of the MPs is to elect the cabinet members. The cabinet 
must enforce the statutes which the parliament enacts.  The cabinet is also responsible 
for implementing the agreed policies.  The state must ensure that, among other things, 
the nation’s resources are efficiently allocated and no one suffers from extreme poverty. 
The problem arises when the public and the state have conflicting interests. What 
constitutes the public’s interest however is difficult to ascertain. The term ‘public’ 
comprises a vast majority of people. In real life personal interests of the members of 
public are unlikely to be identical which makes it very difficult to accurately identify 
and define public’s interest. The state has the discretionary power to determine how the 
country’s resources are to be allocated. Hence, the state has the ultimate responsibility 
in defining the public’s interest. The extent of the principal-agent problem therefore 
depends on (a) state’s ideology, (b) the interest of the majority in the country and (c) 
how close the two are matched. 
The second set of relationship involves the state as the principal and the civil servants as 
the agents. The ministers are expected to ensure that their subordinates implement the 
relevant policies and carry out their tasks diligently and ethically. The public 
bureaucracy makes a contractual agreement with the civil servants which specify their 
responsibilities, salaries and other benefits. Unfortunately, the contracts are often 
incomplete. It is technically infeasible to spell out specifically in the contracts how the 
workers are to allocate their working hours and how and when the assigned tasks are to 
be completed. It is not practical to monitor every action of the workers.  The cost of 
such monitoring is simply too high. The presence of asymmetric information worsens 
the situation.  Because of the presence of asymmetric information, principals may find it 
hard to fully understand the rationale of decisions made by their agents. In real life, 
some civil servants make decisions that maximize their own interest at the expense of 
the public’s interest. 
Singapore’s public sector utilises the pay for performance principle in an attempt to 
align the interest of civil servants with the state. The objective is to encourage the civil 
servants to perform their tasks with the community’s interest in mind. The remuneration 
package of the civil servants is linked to their performance, not so much with seniority. 
The performance-linked remuneration is tied to the variable component of the total 
wage received. The system tends to reward high achievers and penalize under 
performers. It may be useful to note here that the Singapore public sector has been 
actively pursuing the flexible wage system since the National Wage Council (NWC) 
recommended the system in 1986 following the recession in 1985. While the private 
sector does not appear to have fully embraced the recommendations of NWC, the 
adjusted salary structure of the civil service in Singapore now includes a variable 
component that is larger than the recommended size as shown in Table 1. It was 
recently reported that as much as 40 percent of the civil service pay package consists of 
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TABLE 1: The Civil Service and the Wage Targets 
 NWC Guidelines 
 
Civil service 
1986 Flexible pay with an annual variable 
component of 20 percent 
Stated in 1998, and met 20 percent 
AVC target in 1991 
1999 Another 10 percent of total wage set 
aside as monthly variable 
component 
Today, MVC is more than 20 
percent of total wages 
2002 Total variable components 
recommended: 
 
• Not less than 40 
percent for top management 
• 30-40 percent for 
middle managers 
• 30 percent for 
workers 
 
Minimum-maximum salary ratio 
should be 1.5 within four to six 
years 
 
More than 40 percent of wages of 
top management is variable, and at 





Average salary ratio is already 1.5 
Source: The Straits Times (20 June 2003) 
Note: AVC: average variable component, MVC: monthly variable component. Source: 
The Straits Times, 20 June 2003.  
Public enterprises like the statutory boards and GLCs in Singapore are not required to 
follow the human resource policies and remuneration systems that are the norm within 
the civil service. This allows GLCs to take steps that (a) enhance staff morale and (b) 
attract and retain talented staff. 6  Like the civil servants in public institutions, staff 
employed by statutory boards and GLCs are paid competitive salaries as compared to 
their counterparts in the private sector. 
Another way to align the interest of the state and civil servants is to link the government 
agencies’ financial budget to their respective specified targets. For example, the Inland 
Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) is able to promote efficiency and effectiveness 
in tax collection because the government has linked IRAS’s income or budget to the 
amount of revenue collected.  IRAS is allowed to retain a specified percentage of tax 
collected in excess of the collection target.  In addition to the normal agency fee of 1.65 
per cent of the targeted revenue, IRAS is entitled to an additional performance based fee 
amounting to as much as two per cent of the difference between the actual and projected 
tax revenue. It is worth noting that a reduction in the fee awarded is possible if the 
actual revenue falls short of the initial target (Asher, 2002). 
The civil service and IRAS experience shows that the Singaporean public sector has 
successfully established a strong link between the pay and performance as compared to 
the private sector. While assessing the performance of GLCs, it is useful to consider the 
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role of Temasek Holdings Limited (THL). Established in June 1974, THL assumed the 
role of the state-owned institutional investor ‘to track the performance of the various 
(government) investments and companies’ (Ho C., 2004). THL Chairman indicated that 
the character of THL ‘derives from the character of the political leadership in Singapore 
with the qualities of honesty, meritocracy, focus on the right than the popular decision 
and transparency being the main features’ Dhanabalan (2002).  
Being a shareholder representative of the government, THL exerts pressure on the 
GLCs to strengthen their standards of corporate governance. With the THL, a team 
exists that looks after the stewardship matters of its companies, including board 
appointments (Ang and Ding, 2006). In Singapore, boards of directors govern statutory 
boards and GLCs. The boards approve proposals tabled by the executive managers, 
provide inputs on strategic plans and monitor the performance of the managers. Each of 
the statutory boards and GLCs is mandated to set up board of directors with 
representatives from statutory boards, ministries, unions, private sector and higher-
learning institutions. THL exercises its right to make appointments of the main 
personnel working for GLCs. THL searches for talented staff domestically as well as 
internationally to sit on GLCs management boards, recognizing that ‘the character, 
values and competence of the people who lead the company at board and management 
level are the most important requirements for the success of a company’ (Dhanabalan, 
2002). Hence, in the case of Singapore, it is inevitable that the parliament, the cabinet 
and the Ministry of Finance play both direct and indirect roles through THL in the 
governance of GLCs (Ho K.L., 2004). The fact that a majority of the directors were 
formerly from the civil service further raises the likelihood that some of the public 
sector practices would transfer to GLCs. 
The two sets of principal-agent problem can be summarized in Table 2 below. 
TABLE 2: Governance Structure in the Public Sector 
 Principal(s) Agent(s) 
1. General Public  
(Voters) 
State 
(Members of parliament; Members of 
the cabinet) 
2. State 
(Members of parliament; Members of 
the cabinet) 
Managers 
(Civil Servants in the Public Sector) 
Source: Sam, 2003 
As indicated earlier, Singapore government has been able to promote industrial growth 
through its influence on GLCs.  However, it should be noted that not all GLCs can be 
described as a role model for the private sector.  The rest of this section outlines some 
negative aspects of GLCs.  GLCs are some times accused of acting like ‘big bullies’ in 
Singapore’s corporate environment. From the local businessmen perspectives, what 
distinguishes GLCs from the non-GLCs is the strong political connection that GLCs 
have. The political connection gives GLCs added advantages because of the ‘guidance’ 
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they may either deliberately or unconsciously receive from the bureaucracy (i.e., the 
ministries and the statutory boards). In this respect, the business community is not very 
keen with the idea of the government acting as entrepreneurs. GLCs could in fact 
unwittingly stifle entrepreneurship in Singapore. 
There has been pressure on the government to sell its interests in non-strategic GLCs.  
A subcommittee established by the parliament has recently recommended that the 
government should establish and maintain only those GLCs that are responsible in 
managing critical resources (such as the air and seaports), achieving public policy 
objectives (such as those related to health and education) and developing new growth 
engines.  How far the divestment goes and the speed of its progress are difficult to 
predict, and depend very much on the top leadership of the country. With the 
appointment of Ho Ching at the realm of the THL and her connection with Lee Kuan 
Yew (her father-in-law) and Lee Hsien Loong (her husband), her views regarding the 
future of GLCs would be very important.  Her recent public speeches suggest that she is 
in favour of divesting some non-strategic GLCs (see http://www.temasek.com.sg).7 
As far as GLCs are concerned, not every thing has gone according to the plan. For 
example, Singapore Telecommunications failed to acquire Cable and Wireless Hong 
Kong Telecommunications (C&W HKT) in Hong Kong and Time Engineering in 
Malaysia (in March and May 2002 respectively).  Singtel lost the acquisition battle in its 
2nd attempt to purchase the Malaysia Renong-controlled, Time Engineering in 2000.  It 
is believed that the deal fell through when the Malaysian government changed its mind 
concerning its flagship telecommunications company’s desire to join hands with Singtel 
(Chee, 2001, p. 58).  The Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) also acquired big 
stakes in Dao Heng (in April 2000) and Thai Danu (in January 1998).  DBS bought over 
50.3 percent of Thai Danu (a bank in Thailand) for US$104 million without sufficient 
scrutiny of its loan portfolio and other issues which led to a significant decline in DBS’s 
profits in 1998 (Ang et al, 2000). Some observers believe that a premium has to be paid 
for acquisitions by GLCs because of their close link with the government (Low, 2002).  
Besides Thai Danu, it is widely believed that Singtel paid too much for Optus.  It can 
therefore be argued that some GLCs might be better off without government backing, 
particularly those with strong business profile. 
In a recent Standard & Poor’s (S&P) survey of GLCs, it was noted that Keppel Corp, 
Keppel Fels Energy and Infrastructure, Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing (CMI), 
and Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) had below average business profile (Low, 2002).  
These companies were suffering from financial vulnerability. For example, CMI has 
suffered losses for the last three years amounting to US$1.1 billion as it failed to 
weather the downturn in the electronics sector and compete with its Taiwanese 
counterparts (The Straits Times, 24 April 2004). 
In February 1994, the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) project was launched as a 
Singapore-China government cooperation project. The China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park Development (CSSD) was 65% owned by a Singapore led consortium. 
This consortium was made up of Singaporean private companies, GLCs, statutory 
boards, and non-Singapore multinationals.  It has been suggested that the arrogance of 
some government officials towards the Chinese led to the failure of this project (see 
Pereira, 2003).  Low (2002) argues that the project would have been more successful if 
it was led by smaller Singaporean private firms. 
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In July 2003, Sembcorp Logistics, part of the Sembcorp Industries group and one of the 
leading GLCs in Singapore, uncovered an accounting fraud in its subsidiary in India.  It 
was found that certain individuals in the finance department had created fictitious 
documents and inflated revenues and profits by about S$18.5 million between 2000 and 
2002. This is the second time the company had to amend its financial statements. In 
March 2003, the company amended its financial statement when its Swiss associate, 
Kuehne & Nagel International announced a write-off that Sembcorp Logistics had failed 
to take into account (ACGA News Brief, 2003). 
In December 2003, ST Telemedia, a GLC, bought 61.5% of Global Crossing for 
US$250 million thus assisting the latter to emerge from bankruptcy in 1991.  ST 
Telemedia claimed that a stringent and thorough due diligence process was followed 
before the purchase. However, on 27 April 2004, Global Crossing stunned the market 
by announcing that it had understated by up to US$80 million the money it owed to 
other companies in 2003 for services rendered. The accounting error could pose 
difficulty to Global Crossing in arranging for the required funds to finance its 
expenditure programs. Some analysts had warned that ST Telemedia, as the majority 
shareholder, might have to bear the full brunt of Global Crossing’s funding needs which 
could amount to as much as US$252 million or more. More bad news followed when 
Global Crossing’s investors filed a lawsuit against the company and two of its 
executives for causing them to suffer share price losses. If the company is ordered to 
pay for damages but does not have the money to do so, it may eventually turn to the 
controlling shareholders, ST Telemedia, for further funds (The Straits Times, 29 April 
2004; 4 May 2004). 
The above suggests that not all GLCs in Singapore are a role model for the private 
sector firms.  The following section deals with problem of corruption which is usually 
discussed in the context of public sector corporations.  The collapse of big names such 




In its simplest form corruption involves bribery.8  Corruption is a serious problem that 
exists everywhere but its severity varies from country to country.  International agencies 
have ranked Singapore as one of the least corrupt countries in the world.9  Up until 
recently, corruption was considered to be mainly a public sector problem. However 
recent scandals involving large multinationals appear to have reinforced the view that 
significant corruption exists in the private sector. Several causes of corruption have 
been noted in the literature. Low salary is considered to be one of the main reasons for 
corruption (Mauro, 1997 and Van Rijkeghem and Weder, 1997).10  Corruption is likely 
to be more severe if the probability of catching the offenders is low and the punishments 
imposed on offenders are not significantly high.  In other words, the level of corruption 
is linked to its opportunity cost. 
Healthy budgetary situation has allowed Singapore government to pay competitive 
salaries to all civil servants. The public sector salary revisions are carried out regularly 
(a recent revision was concluded in 2000) to ensure that the gap between the public and 
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private sector salaries is not significant.  Top public sector executives receive very high 
salaries.  For example, the government ministers in Singapore are currently paid as 
much as S$50,000 per month each while the prime minister receives around S$85,000 
per month, making them possibly the highest paid government officers in the world.  
The efforts of the Singaporean government have been acknowledged by many including 
Tanzi (1998).11  
Besides paying high salaries, the government of Singapore has enacted relevant anti-
corruption laws and strengthened the anti-corruption agency to minimize opportunity 
for corruption. The Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) for example was enacted in 
1960 to provide the necessary legislation to curb corruption, replacing the less efficient 
legislation, the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) which was enacted in 
1937. Some of the improvements made in POCA include higher penalties for corruption 
related offences and introduction of new laws to give more power to the anti-corruption 
agency (CPIB) in Singapore. CPIB is an independent institution housed in the prime 
minister’s office where its director is answerable only to the Prime Minister, and its 
officers appointed by the President. Because it is possible for the Prime Minister to be 
investigated himself, a provision exists in Singapore’s constitution which allows the 
Director to proceed with investigations ‘despite any direction to the contrary from the 
Prime Minister’ (Ho, 2003, p. 269). The new laws give power to CPIB officers to 
scrutinize the accounts of individuals working in the public and private sectors.  CPIB 
also has the authority to summon witnesses to assist in its investigations (see Quah, 
2003 for further details). 
Besides CPIB, other parties capable of filling the role of formal monitoring agents 
include tax department (to scrutinize the accounts), auditing firms and credit/bond rating 
agencies (to provide independent assessments and ratings), judicial system (to provide 
effective legal protection), media (to provide information on private misdeeds by 
agents) and the Head of State (like the President in the parliamentary system of 
government).  
The methods used to curb corruption in public corporations can in fact also be applied 
in private corporations.  Unfortunately, it is often difficult for the principals to monitor 
closely the activities of the agents. In public listed companies the shareholders 
(principals) delegate the task of controlling the firm to managers (agents). The agents 
have discretionary power over the use of the companies’ resources.  The recent 
corporate scandals suggest that some executive managers are involved in corrupt 
practices.  Corrupt activities can be discouraged by the management board by 
introducing measures that lower the incentive and opportunity for corruption. Paying 
the executive managers higher salaries, increasing the probability of getting caught (like 
setting the audit committee headed by an independent member of the board) and 
protecting the whistleblowers are the common recommendations.  However it turns out 
that paying a higher wage does not always curb corruption.  Indeed some corporate 
executives have been involved in falsifying the financial records to show huge profits 
because only huge profits can justify their salaries and benefits.  In fact, the Enron case 
demonstrates how formal mechanisms can fail to prevent corrupt practices that could 
result in the collapse of a well established corporation. It is interesting to note that 
Enron was monitored by no less than eight agencies/departments - few, if any, were able 
to catch or knew anything about what Enron was up to (Branson, 2003). Hence, in a 
typical organization, it is generally useful to attempt to inculcate good group norms. The 
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reason is that, with imperfect information, individuals are more likely to adopt the 
‘follow-the-norm’ mentality.  Ferrell, Fraedrich and Ferrell (2002) noted that as many 
as 80 percent of the workforce adopted the follow-the-norm mentality rather than 
following their own instincts or go against the norms.  Accordingly, it is imperative that 
good business norms are established and are complied. 
As far as Singapore is concerned, there appears to be a strong political will among the 
politicians to contain and eradicate corruption. The political leaders frequently appeal to 
the moral consciousness of public servants.  The constant and continuous effort put in 
by the political leaders appears to have contributed towards a strong public support 
against corruption.  There is a perception that all complaints lodged with CPIB would 
be seriously investigated.  It is also interesting to note that the public sector in 
Singapore provides information on the potential cost of corrupt activities. Corruption 
cases involving the public sector are readily reported by the media.  The government 
does not appear to have hesitated to prosecute people involved in corruption regardless 
of their status which may have discouraged corruption.12  Private corporations through 
their intranet systems can also report corruption related cases which took place within 
and outside their respective organizations. 
Sociologists such as Granovetter (2005), among others, suggest building a strong social 
network within the working community. Appointing trusted people who are capable of 
doing the right things allows for flow of quality information and serves as a source of 
reward and punishment whose impact is magnified because the information comes from 
someone personally known. In fact, a key aspect of the Singaporean model is the 
appointment of trusted individuals from the civil service to GLCs. As an indicator, we 
refer to Worthington’s (2003) study, which finds that the public sector in Singapore 
dominated GLC directorship, accounting for more than 70 percent of the directorships 
in 1991. In 1998, the public sector representation increased as it accounted for 74 
percent of the representation in GLCs. As such, there is a strong social network among 
GLCs. The fact that a majority of the Singaporean GLCs have done very well over a 
significant period of time suggests the workability of this approach.13  
Interestingly, most studies on corruption in Singapore focus almost exclusively on the 
positive aspects of its anti-corruption strategy (Quah, 2003; Tan, 2003; Ho, 2003). But 
the fact remains that Singapore is not the least corrupt country in the world.  Both IMD 
and TI consider Singapore to be more corrupt than Finland.  The differences between 
the corruption strategy employed by Finland and Singapore are as follows.  Firstly, 
Finland is a very strong welfare society whereby the state provides free education at all 
levels and free health care for everyone. Old age pension is also provided for everyone 
over 65. Provision of such social services could have lessened the incentive for 
corruption in Finland (Tiihonen, 2003). The situation in Singapore is quite different in 
this regard.  The welfare system in Singapore is relatively weak. A significant burden of 
the social welfare is borne by the individuals’ themselves. PAP is against the idea of 
cash or transfer payments.  Financial assistance schemes are rare in Singapore. Even if 
assistance is provided, it is temporary and administered in an ad hoc fashion. In fact in 
Singapore, financial assistance schemes are deemed undesirable and are considered to 
be undermining the goal of self-reliance. Instead, PAP has often emphasized that the 
best form of social security is the pursuance of high economic growth so that more 
employment opportunities are provided (Asher and Rajan, 2002). The problem with this 
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system is that public officers might have a greater incentive to receive bribes so as to 
enable them to attain their desired standards of living. 
Secondly, it is unusual in Finland to appoint someone from outside of the public sector 
to high level positions (Tiihonen, 2003). In the case of Singapore, it is not unusual for 
PAP to scout for talents from the private sector. For example, the current Prime 
Minister, Goh Chok Tong, was recruited from Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), a private-
listed company partially owned by the government. The reason given was that 
Singapore had a limited pool of qualified people. Courting the talented individuals from 
the private sector and retaining them is a common practice in Singapore’s public sector.  
However, this situation can lead to conflict of interest.  In addition, it is not uncommon 
for PAP members of parliament in Singapore to hold directorship in public listed 
companies. For example Wang Kai Yuen holds 11 directorships while John Chen has 8 
directorships and Ong Kian Min has 11 directorships (The Straits Times, 29 April 
2004). It is important that the MPs are able to draw the line between their private and 
public positions although doing so might not appear to be easy in practice. Monitoring 
such behaviour is also difficult because of asymmetric information. The tendency for 
corruption to take place in Singapore might be compounded by the fact that the 
residents are generally strong followers of the Confucianism school. Confucian values, 
which place paternalism over legalism and a strong emphasis on family loyalty appears 
to provide a justification for nepotism. 
If the notion of corruption is to include poor corporate governance practices, Singapore 
could not be regarded as a corruption free economy at least in a literal sense. For 
example, in a joint ACGA/CLSA Emerging Market survey released in May 2003, a 
large gap was found which separated the best and worst performing firms in Singapore. 
While Singapore companies were ranked second after South Korea in practising good 
corporate governance norms, the worst companies in the Republic were considered to 
be worse than the worst-performing firms in China, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand. One of the cases involves the late billionaire Khoo Teck Puat 
who was accused in March 2004 for not disclosing the extent of his control in several 
listed companies (The Straits Times, 29 April 2004). 
Rapid globalization in conjunction with improved information technology presents new 
challenges for combating corruption.  Instant transfer of funds across international 
boundaries and the popularity of online transactions facilitate concealment of 
corruption.  Anti-corruption strategies may have to be modified and the responsible 
agencies may have to rely more on tip-offs and whistleblowers. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article considers aspects of public sector corporate governance in Singapore.  
Despite differences in overall objectives, at least some of the problems faced by the 
public as well as the private corporations are identical.  The recent scandals involving 
Enron Energy and HIH Insurance suggest that corruption can also create serious 
problems for the private sector corporations.  The paper argues that although the 
principal-agent problem is usually coughed in the context of private sector firms, the 
public sector is confronted with similar problems.  The successful governance of 
government-linked corporations in Singapore provides a good model for large private 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 7  ·  Issue 2  ·  2006  ·  © International Public Management Network 
76 
 
corporations.  Lower incidence of corruption in Singaporean public sector corporations 
can be attributed to (a) the lack of opportunities and incentive for corruption and (b) 
strong anti-corruption culture in Singapore.  Private corporations facing similar 
problems can benefit from the experiences of the Singaporean government linked 
corporations. 
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1 The transformation of Singapore from a third-world to a first-world country is a 
significant achievement given the fact that the country has no natural resources.  
Strategic location and skilled and disciplined labour force are its major assets.  The 
ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has won every election since 
independence in 1965.  Its popularity appears to be closely linked with the strong 
economic growth that is attributed by many to PAP’s high standards of governance.  It 
is interesting to note that the Singaporean system consists of only one level of 
government, one level of judiciary and one parliament. 
2 Some well-known examples include WorldCom, Enron, Kellogg, Johnson & Johnson, 
Parmalat and Xerox. 
3 Recognition of the agency problem within the public sector can be traced back to Max 
Weber. In Economic and Society, Weber (1978[1922], pp. 225, 991-995) recognizes 
that state officials (agents) are often able to make decisions in contrary to the state 
(principal) interest. Public Choice School led by James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock and 
William Niskanen formalizes the agency problem in the public sector. Niskanen (1971) 
utilized a utility function that includes aggregate budget as an argument - an increase in 
the size of budget increases the utility of the bureaucrats. This results in the bureau 
having a myopic view, with a stronger preference for costly capital-intensive production 
process. 
4 Singaporean private sector is not immune to corruption.  For example, the Royal 
Brothers were charged in 1997 for offering at least S$1 million to the General Managers 
of HL Bank in return of lower annual interest rate of company bonds used to re-finance 
hotels partly owned by the brothers. Although the prosecution withdrew the charge, the 
brothers were charged in 1999 for giving false information in relation to this case. In a 
separate case in 1997, the brothers were charged for corruptly receiving S$2 million for 
the approval of a lease application involving a food court.  Former Amcol Holdings 
Limited executive director and corporate trader were investigated and charged for 
conspiring to cheat Amcol Holdings Limited into investing US$39.6 million in a project 
in Mauritius. They were sentenced to 18 months’ and 20 months’ imprisonment 
respectively. 
5 In a recent ranking of the top companies in Singapore in terms of their market 
capitalization, the top four companies were GLCs namely, Singtel (S$39,066.2 million), 
DBS Group (S$26,783.7 million), SIA (S$20,949.7 million) and Chart Semiconductor 
(S$20.8 billion).  See Low (2001) for further details. 
6 Consider the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS), which has been 
collecting taxes on behalf of the government since 1992.  As the principal, IRAS must 
ensure that its agents (tax officials) carry out their tasks effectively and efficiently - 
IRAS board recognizes this. The board attempts to provide fair and equal opportunity 
for its staff to advance to higher positions not only within IRAS but also in other public 
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institutions.  In addition, IRAS board has approved a policy to peg the earnings of 
IRAS’s tax specialists to those of private sector tax partners or principals (Sia and Neo, 
2000, p. 541). This policy allows IRAS to combat corruption. 
7 Bhaskaran (2003) believes that divestment of GLCs would not be attractive to the 
government during economic downturn.  His views are based on the observation that 
economic downturn is often associated with deflation in asset prices.  Accordingly, 
selling off the government’s stake would mean lower revenue for the government. 
While it is generally agreed that maximizing the selling price is the right thing to do in 
any business transaction, Bhaskaran suggests that the government should examine the 
cost and benefit for the whole economy. 
8 Other forms of corruption include extortion and nepotism.  Extortion includes a public 
servant demanding gifts or favours in the execution of public duties.  Nepotism includes 
the appointment of relatives, friends or political associates to public offices regardless 
of their merits and consequences on the public weal (see Alatas, 1999). 
9 World Competitiveness Report 2005 ranked Singapore as the fifth least corrupt 
economy among 30 countries with population less than 20 million.  Singapore’s Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau website, http://www.cpib.gov.sg, also provides the 
corruption ranking for Singapore from Transparency International (TI) and the Political 
and Economic Risk Consultancy Limited (PERC).  TI has consistently ranked 
Singapore as one of the 10 least corrupt countries during 1995-2004.  PERC ranked 
Singapore as the least corrupt country in the world for the last 10 consecutive years. 
10 Empirical evidence appears to support the view of a negative relationship between 
corruption and civil service pay. For example, Mauro (1997) argues that lower wages in 
the public sector as compared to those in the private sector increased the tendency of 
corruption among public servants.  Monetary incentives offered by firms or potential 
offenders encourage public officers to accept bribes, especially if they feel that their 
wage levels are being unreasonably lower than their counterparts in the private sector.  
Van Rijkeghem and Weder (1997) empirically tested the hypothesis of a negative 
relationship and found that higher relative civil service pay led to lower corruption. 
11 Tanzi writes “….countries have increased salary differentials to be able to retain and 
attract more able, productive, and honest individuals. Over the years, Singapore has 
pursued a wage policy aimed at reducing the temptation for public officers to engage in 
acts of corruption. Reportedly, the salaries of ministers and other high-level officers in 
Singapore are among the highest paid in the world.  A common belief is that in 
situations of low wages but high possibilities of corruption, less honest individuals will 
be attracted to the civil service…... (Tanzi, 1998, p. 573). However, paying higher 
salaries could not guarantee that public officers would replace illegitimate income with 
legitimate income. Some of them may prefer to keep both, particularly those holding 
sensitive positions. The approach can also lead to a trade off in the sense that the budget 
size required to finance programs to improve people’s life may remain low and 
inadequate. See Johnston (2000). 
12 Corruption related offences receive extensive coverage in Singapore media.  Some 
prominent corruption cases involves the then Minister of National Development who 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 




was accused of accepting two bribes amounting to S$1 million in 1981 and 1982.  The 
same minister was accused of accepting bribes from two developers to allow one of 
them to retain the land which had already been acquired by the government and the 
other to purchase state land for private development.  In 1991, the then Director of the 
Commercial Affairs Department (the anti-graft and investigative arm of the Ministry of 
Finance) was charged and convicted of corruption in a business deal.  In 2000, a 
Nominated Member of Parliament was tried by a criminal court on at least three 
corruption charges. More recently, the chief executive of the National Trade Union 
Congress (NTUC) Choice Homes was investigated by CPIB for illegally using NTUC 
Choice Homes’ funds for stock market trade.  Another recent case involved a senior 
housing board officer responsible for supervising upgrading projects in the eastern area.  
He was charged for asking for bribes from two sub-contractors in the form of free 
renovation work to his house (The Straits Times, 28 August 2003).  
13 Although the model has worked generally well, at least in the Singapore case, it is not 
free from criticisms. United States, State Department (2001) expressed concerns that (1) 
government influence over the management of GLCs may constitute an unfair 
advantage over non-GLCs in contract bidding and access to loans, and (2) former civil 
servants holding senior positions at THL and GLCs may be less inclined to take 
significant risks. In addition, critics have raised questions on a number of appointments 
at THL and GLCs. THL CEO Ho Ching, for example, is the wife of Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong and daughter-in-law of Lee Kuan Yew. Lee Hsien Yang, brother of PM 
Lee is currently heading Singapore Telecommunications, a GLC. When asked about the 
perception that the only way to shake up GLCs is to bring in a member of the Lee 
family, former PM Goh Chok Tong agreed but said, ‘But what do you do? Because of 
the perception, you don’t appoint Lee Hsien Yang, you don’t appoint Ho Ching, and 
any number of their relatives to high position?’ Goh sees the perception as a ‘big 
problem politically for us’. [Q&A: Singapore’s Premier on the Power of the Lee 
Family’, Business Week, 24 June 2002]. These are some issues that have been around 
for quite some time. Temasek Charter, released in July 2002, attempts to address some 
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